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Resumo
A Parceria Euro-Mediterrânica celebrada em
Barcelona em Novembro de 1995 pela União
Europeia com os Doze Estados Parceiros do Sul
foi oficialmente desenhada para promover a
estabilidade, paz e prosperidade na região da
bacia do Mediterrâneo. Tratou-se de uma inicia-
tiva para regular a periferia sul e que os esta-
dos-parceiros não poderiam ignorar devido à
sua localização e dependência económica em
relação à Europa. Esta iniciativa reflectiu o con-
junto de relações estruturais através do Medi-
terrâneo, que remontam ao período colonial e às
iniciativas de construção da confiança e coope-
ração desde a independência.
A sua natureza holística traduziu-se num con-
junto de relações económicas, políticas, sociais,
culturais e de segurança reflectindo a própria
natureza da União. Os resultados económicos a
curto prazo ameaçam ser desvantajosos a não ser
que os Estados do Sul do Mediterrâneo possam
combinar as suas economias num mercado único
e que as questões de segurança não sejam blo-
queadas pela actual situação no Médio Oriente e
pela exclusão dos EUA do processo de paz. As
consequências sociais e políticas levarão mais
tempo a tomar forma, mas a longo prazo poderão
vir a ser as mais importantes. Será através da
interdependência da Europa e do Mediterrâneo
Sul em relação às questões da energia e da emi-
gração que o significado do Processo de Barcelo-
na adquirirá maior significado.
Abstract
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, signed at
Barcelona in November 1995 by the European Union
with twelve South Mediterranean Partner states
was officially designed to produce a region of stability,
peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean basin.  It
was, however, a policy designed by the Union to
regulate its southern periphery, which the partner-
-states could not ignore because of their location and
their dependence on economic relations with Europe. 
It also reflected long-standing relationships across
the Mediterranean, reaching back to pre-colonial
times, as well as previous confidence-building and
cooperative initiatives since independence.
Its holistic nature, covering economic, political,
security, social and cultural relations, reflected the
nature of the Union itself.  Economic outcomes in
the short-term threaten to be disadvantageous unless
South Mediterranean states can combine their
economies into a single market and security issues
are blocked by the on-going conflict in the Middle
East and the exclusion of the United States from the
peace process.  Social and political consequences will
take longer to emerge but may, in the long-term, be
the most important.  Yet it is the interdependence
of Europe and the South Mediterranean over energy
and migration that the true meaning of the Barcelona
Process will eventually be revealed.
* Intervenção proferida no âmbito da Conferência “Portugal e o Mediterrâneo”, Instituto da Defesa Nacional,
Lisboa, Março de 2001.
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In November 1995, the European Union signed a wide-ranging declaration with the
twelve littoral states of the South Mediterranean at the end of a major conference in
Barcelona. The declaration outlined an agreed policy for future relations between Europe
and its Mediterranean partners which sought to create a zone of shared stability, prosperity
and peace. This policy is designed to condition relations throughout the Mediterranean on
a new basis of partial economic integration and cooperation over mutual security issues,
together with support for regional political, cultural and social development. It has
extremely ambitious objectives and represents a new departure for the European Union,
although the means proposed to achieve it have been modest, not least in view of the fact
that it seeks to realise its objectives by 2010.
In reality, however, the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the official title given
to the policy, although it is better known as the Barcelona Process – is an exercise in
European policy-making, in which its South Mediterranean partners have little choice but
to acquiesce. It is an attempt to organise Europe’s southern periphery, an exercise in
European power projection in order to deal with security threats and risks in terms that the
European Union itself can articulate. As such, it reflects Europe’s own lack of capacity in
hard security terms – such issues are currently left to NATO or, in the Eastern Mediterranean
or the Gulf, to the United States and its chosen allies, although the new European rapid
reaction force, once it is established, will give some teeth to Europe’s new security and
defence policy, even if formally within the context of NATO. The Barcelona Process is, in
short, an exercise in soft power projection, to deal with soft security issues, such as
economic failure, migration, smuggling – whether of drugs or people – and the associated
trans-national problems of crime and international terrorism.
The mechanisms chosen to address these issues reflect the orthodoxies forced upon
European policy-makers by the nature of the Union itself. The innate tensions within the
Union between national sovereignty and collective action – most obviously manifest in the
relative weakness of Europe’s common foreign and security policy, despite the new role of
former NATO secretary-general, Xavier Solana as its secretary-general to the Council of
Ministers – mean that European regional periphery policy can only operate at the level of
the lowest common denominator acceptable to member states. It has also meant that the
policy should be holistic, without recall to specificities designed to address particular
aspects of Mediterranean security. Furthermore, since Europe lacks any effective collective
military force, despite the 1999 Helsinki summit decision to create the 60.000 – strong rapid
reaction force, it clearly cannot take on hard security responsibilities alone. Indeed, as the
Bosnia and Kosovo experiences demonstrated, it requires NATO and American support
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for any such action – and that means that many problems in the South Mediterranean
region, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, are outside Europe’s competence alone.
Indeed, one of the great ironies of Europe’s policy towards the South Mediterranean is that
it cannot achieve its objectives before American initiatives in the Middle East have
succeeded – although the United States has no role within the Barcelona Process!
European policy, however, is not simply a consequence of the constraints imposed
upon the Union by its own nature. It also reflects an historical experience and a view of the
Mediterranean as a European borderland – the “forgotten frontier” of the confrontation
between Christianity and Islam, between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries1, as much
as the Braudelian vision of the Mediterranean as a common cultural space. Such attitudes
have helped to inform the holism of the European vision, in comparison to a much more
complicated American understanding of what the Mediterranean represents in geo-strategy
and geo-politics. For the United States, although the Mediterranean is not a key strategic
region, it is one of considerable complexity. As a strategic line-of-communication, mainly
for the passage of oil, its security has a direct implication for world energy prices,
particularly for world crude oil prices. As a region of vastly different geographically
located problems, it is treated on a sub-regional basis, with Middle Eastern affairs –
specifically the Middle East peace process-dominating concerns, in which soft and hard
security responses may be used. As a region dominated by sub-hegemonic states – Israel,
Egypt, Turkey and Algeria – each such state reflects a different aspect of American regional
strategic concerns, whether strategic security, economic expansion or access to raw
materials, especially in the East, alongside strategic control of surrounding regions, such
as the Gulf and the Caucasus.
The background to Barcelona
European Union policy formation mechanisms could not respond to such complexity,
nor could the European Commission manage it, given the meagre managerial resources
available to it. Thus, the European Mediterranean vision is borne from exigency as much
as choice and history. Equally, the current policy – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership –
1 Hesse A. (1974), The forgotten frontier, University of Chicago Press.
Braudel F. (I %4), The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the reign of Philip 11, (two vols) F ontana
Books.
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is part of a long and slow process of policy evolution that, in its modern form, really stems
from the colonial period, particularly from the French colonial possessions in North Africa
– the modern states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, collectively known as the Maghrib.
Its European predecessors reflected European awareness of the economic consequences of
the colonial period and of the Maghrib’s subsequent dependence on access to the European
market, particularly for its agricultural and primary product exports, as well as for exports
from the developing industrial sectors there. It also reflected European realisation that
demographic pressures in the region required accelerated economic development if popu-
lar aspirations were to be met and increased labour migration flows into Europe were to
be avoided.
As a result of the specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome for the Maghrib, this
awareness was expressed, after 1969, in a series of bilateral cooperation and association
agreements, together with five-year financial protocols providing development aid. The
agreements, although specifically in economic nature – they provided for free access of
industrial goods and primary products whilst subjecting agricultural exports to quota
regimes because of the Common Agricultural Policy – also, as time went by, began to refer
to issues of governance and respect for human rights. Indeed, in 1992, the European
Parliament, in a fit of pique over Morocco’s behaviour in the Western Sahara, actually
withheld permission for the relevant financial protocol – to the embarrassment of the
Commission which had had, only five years before, to discourage a Moroccan application
for European Community membership, not on the grounds of failures in governance but
because it was not a definably European country. Morocco retaliated by creating difficulties
over its fishing agreement with the European Union, a matter of significance to Spain and
Portugal for whom access to Moroccan fishing grounds was crucial.
The policy develops
This apparently trivial spat, however, was to have much more significant consequences.
The European Union’s Commission had long been aware that the bilateral cooperation
agreements were no longer adequate to respond to the problems of the South Mediterranean
region in the post-Cold War period. Although it had attempted to react to this through its
“Renovated Mediterranean Policy” – which provided for a more complex aid funding
function and an adjusted quota arrangement for agricultural goods to allow for full
Spanish and Portuguese membership of the Union by 1996, at the end of a ten year
transition period – it was clear that the new policy was not going to meet the demands that
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would be placed upon it And those demands essentially expressed the security concerns
of European countries over effective policy to deal with unwanted immigration flows,
since the prolonged recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s had caused a significant
increase in European structural unemployment.
Yet these migration flows, which had been traditional patterns of population movement
since the beginning of the century for North Africans and since the Second World War for
Turks and Egyptians, were expected to increase dramatically in the future, unless something
were done to staunch them. European states also sought policies that would minimise
spill-over from security problems within the South Mediterranean region itself – not least
the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also, increasingly, the crisis in Algeria. Any policy, however,
had to take into account the other responsibilities and interests of Union members – and
of the Union itself – around its periphery, particularly in the East where, after the end of
the Cold War, policies were in place to support economic and political transition in Eastern
Europe with a view to eventual Union membership.
There was another, related concern as well, which reflected the anxieties of the Union’s
southern members. This was that the new European interest in the former Soviet Bloc
would divert funding flows away from the south of Europe which, since it was less
developed compared with the dominant triad inside the Union-Germany, Britain and
France, or even compared with the Benelux countries, had dominated both Commission
and private investment flows until then. Regional interest, in short, combined with the
Commission’s concerns to generate a new Mediterranean policy, for South European states
believed that a renewed interest in the Mediterranean generally, would solve their fears of
anticipated investment neglect as well. The result was a radical departure in the Union ‘s
Mediterranean policy away from the traditional bilateral format with its emphasis on
economic support.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The new policy was, instead, holistic in nature, directed to the Southern
Mediterranean basin, from Morocco to Turkey. It did not, however, include the
Balkans, an omission which was to cause havoc four years later, when Europe had to
consider how to fund development after the Bosnian and Kosovo crises in its South
Eastern Europe initiative. It also sought to be comprehensive since it did not focus
only on economic development but addressed security, political, cultural and social
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concerns as well. It was in part inspired by the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, which had grown out of the process initiated in the Helsinki
Conference of 1975 and which had played a significant role in undermining the
monolithic nature of the Soviet Bloc. This had emerged in the Mediterranean as the
Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, an Italo-Spanish
proposal pushed – just before the Iraq crisis in 1990 – by the charismatic Italian foreign
minister, Gianni de Michaelis, but abandoned as impossibly ambitious a year later. It
had been followed by the Five plus Five Group, a French-inspired proposal for
consultations about common security problems between five European states – Portu-
gal, Spain, Italy, France and Malta – and the five states of the Maghrib – Libya and
Mauritania had joined the group – who had formed a mutual collective security and
economic integration organisation in 1989, the Maghrib Arab Union, better known by
its French acronym as the UMA, because of its socio-political implications in Arabic.
This, in turn, had been absorbed into another Mediterranean security dialogue, led by
Egypt and created in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue.
The point about these seemingly endless initiatives apparently directed towards
intangible ends was that not only did they act as confidence-building measures in a global
arena totally unfamiliar to South Mediterranean states who had previously been comfortably
ensconced in the stasis of the Cold War but now had to face the fact that super-power
patronage no longer existed, but they also revealed the close relationship between security
issues and political and socio-cultural causes. The crisis in Algeria made the linkages
crystal-clear, particularly after bombs began to explode in France, and few European
statesmen had any illusions about such linkages once they observed the problems faced by
the American-led Middle East peace process. Although Europe had been effectively
excluded from the political dimensions of Middle Eastern peace-making by Israeli suspicion
and resentment after the 1980 Venice Declaration, it was the major funder of the process and,
as a result, also appreciated the links between economics and security in the longer term.
These realisations, in themselves, meant that any new European policy in the Mediterranean
would have to address political and social issues if it were to respond to specifically
European security concerns alongside the Commission’s long-standing economic interests
in the region. Furthermore, such security concerns comprised soft security issues, with
hard security concerns being left to a wider alliance-NATO – which was therefore, by
definition, excluded from the Union’s own polices, alongside the United States! As a result,
yet another dialogue developed as a confidence building measure, the NATO dialogue,
which accommodated some of the Union’s South Mediterranean partners but excluded
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others2, even though the Union itself dealt with all except Libya which was then under
United Nations sanctions because of the Lockerbie affair3.
The new policy, known today as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or, more
colloquially, as the Barcelona Process, and which was rushed out in time to coincide
with the Spanish presidency during the second half of 1995, incorporated all of these
conclusions. Although primarily a security initiative designed to respond to European
concerns by coping with problems along the Union’s southern periphery, it purported
to be – and also was – an attempt at cooperative development within a trans-national
region. Despite the fact that the economic aspect of the new policy was the most highly
developed, there was also a commitment to respond to regional political and security
concerns and aspirations and to resolve cultural and social differences as well.
Consisting of three “baskets” of measures, the policy sought, in the words of the
Barcelona Declaration in which it was formally announced, to create a zone of peace,
stability and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean basin. The unspoken primary
purpose, of course, was to render labour migration from the South unnecessary by
stimulating economic development!
Such development was not only to be a consequence of purely economic measures;
it was also to involve political, social and cultural change, in an atmosphere of
comprehensive security in which all regional states would participate. In the first
basket, political evolution was to address the related problems of human rights, state
legitimacy and the degenerate corporate state in the Middle East and North Africa –
by now profoundly neo-patrimonial and neo-prebendal in nature – by actively
encouraging good governance, based on the assumption that this would best be
achieved through liberal democracy and a market economy. Comprehensive collective
security was to result from an agreed charter of security measures, alongside existing
security arrangements, such as NATO and the Western European Union. There was
here, to be sure, a problem, for no allowance was made for very different American
perceptions of the Mediterranean and the security problems there, an omission that
2 So-called “rogue states” or “states of concern” were excluded from the NATO dialogue. Thus Syria, Lebanon
and Libya still do not take part, although Algeria does, despite its appalling human rights record.
3 Libya was invited into the Barcelona Process as a special guest of the European presidency in mid-1999, after
the suspects in the Lockerbie affair were handed over for trial. It is not a full member of the process, only an
observer, because it has not accepted the Barcelona acquis – the bundle of legislation that accompanies
membership of the Partnership. It does not do so because this would threaten the jamahiri political and
economic system, although it claims that it cannot do so since, although the Partnership is dedicated to peace,
two of its members – Israel and Palestine – are at war and should be expelled until they make peace.
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was keenly felt in Washington despite initial American scepticism over the new
European initiative. The socio-cultural basket, mainly aspirational in nature, was
primarily devoted to supporting the growth of civil-society in the South – despite
governmental distaste for such developments – alongside mutual cultural tolerance.
The economic dimension
It was, however, the economic basket that was the real core of the new initiative.
This had been negotiated in the form of a bilateral association agreement with two
states – Tunisia and Morocco – before the actual structure of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership had been fully developed and would have stood alone as Commission
policy had the full Barcelona package not been completed. It thus bears some study,
for it has had the most profound effect on the Southern Mediterranean to date. Its
structure was deceptively simple for it continued to be bilateral in nature, being
negotiated separately with each non-member partner state and following the principles
of the previous cooperation agreements. Thus it maintained quotas for agricultural
exports in order to protect the Common Agricultural Policy and continued to provide
unlimited access for primary products – mainly oil, natural gas and phosphates.
However, in the industrial arena, it offered a free trade area agreement in addition to
the traditional offer of free access to the European market for industrial goods –
which, in practice, had often been constrained by so-called “voluntary restraint
agreements” over textiles and clothes in order to protect high cost European producers.
The catch was that the offer in effect required South Mediterranean participants to
abandon their own tariff and non-tariff barriers to European industrial exports, thus
exposing previously protected domestic industrial sectors to the full force of European
competition.
Not only did this directly threaten Southern industrial entrepreneurs – and, unless
aid were forthcoming, the threat to Tunisia was estimated to involve the destruction
of a third of its industrial sector and the potential elimination of a further third of its
6,000 industrial enterprises, whilst in Morocco 60 per cent of the industrial base was
said to face a similar fate – it also contained a profound threat to government finances
as well. Outside the oil-rich states of the South, where government revenue depends
heavily on rent in the form of energy taxes, most budgetary revenue is generated by
customs dues and tariffs. Since Europe is by far the largest trade partner for the states
of the Mediterranean region – the Union absorbs 26 per cent of the Arab world’s
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exports and generates 46.5 per cent of its imports and absorbs 46.3 per cent of the
exports of the South Mediterranean partner states, generating 49.7 per cent of their
imports4 – this effectively meant that government revenue would be radically cut. As
a result, new forms of taxation had have to be found in the states that have signed up
to the Partnership – Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to date,
with negotiation under way with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Algeria, whilst Libya
prepares to join in and Israel and Turkey have their own prior free trade and customs
union agreements with the Union. The problem is that many of these states have
difficulties in collecting direct taxation, partly because of poverty but also because of
inadequate collection systems, which lack transparency. As a result, they have turned
to indirect taxation instead and value-added tax has now become common throughout
the region. Whilst its efficiency is undoubted, its regressive character in such countries
is intensified and adds to poverty and inequality of purchasing power.
Of course, lengthy transition periods have been offered to the new beneficiaries of
this variant of the common European economic space which is due to be completed in
2010 – in fact, of course, the South Mediterranean states do not really benefit in
precisely this way yet because of continuing restraints on their trade relations with
Europe. Financial help also exists over the process of transition in the form of the
MEDA financial programme which offered a global sum of €4.865 billion over a five
year period, together with similar amounts in soft loans from the European
Development Bank, of which €2.31 billion was in the form of bilateral aid. In the event,
only €890 million, just 26 per cent of the committed funds, was actually spent by the
end of the five-year period. The funding line was renewed as the MEDA II protocol in
1999 – with a 25 per cent increase in funding to €5.4 billion but intended to cover a
seven, rather than a five year period.
4 These are the states included inside the Barcelona Process: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Other Arab states are excluded,
for there is a separate economic agreement in the process of negotiation with the Gulf Cooperation
Council states, Iraq is excluded by United Nations sanctions and Mauritania and Sudan fall under the
Lomé and ACP agreements. It should, however, be noted that Malta and Cyprus are now to become
European Union members, as is Turkey, and Libya is merely an observer member of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In essence, with the exception of Jordan, all Barcelona Process states
are Mediterranean littoral states. It should also be noted that trade dependence increases markedly if the
commercial relationship between Europe and the Maghrib is isolated – to 57.3 per cent of world imports
and 64.5 per cent of world exports (see Table 3).
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I: MEDA 1 COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 1995-1999
€ million Commitments Disbursements % age spent
Algeria 164 30 18.2
Morocco 656 127 19.4
Tunisia 438 168 39.3
Egypt 686 157 22.9
Jordan 254 108 42.5
Lebanon 182 1 0.5
Syria 99 0 0.0
Turkey 375 15 4.0
West Bank & Gaza 111 54 48.6
Bilateral cooperation 2955 660 22.3
Regional Cooperation1 480 2302 48.0
TOTAL 3,435 890 26.0
Source: European Commission DGExt.
Notes: 1 Includes €63 million committed 1997-99 for technical assistance.
2 Includes €150 million for horizontal cooperation before 1996.
Discussions also began in January 2000 to include agricultural exports within the free
trade areas, but they are not due to be concluded for the next five years, even though,
outside mineral exports, this is the area in which South Mediterranean states – except for
Israel – have the greatest comparative advantage. Equally, no movement is expected on
easing access restrictions to Europe, although, theoretically, the new economic arrangement
should involve the free movement of goods, capital and labour! After all, the agreements
exist primarily to exclude migration and are thus not genuine free trade area agreements,
which should provide for the free movement of goods, capital and labour. Quite how long
these agreements can be sustained as barriers to free movement of labour remains to be
seen, however.
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II: MEDITERRANEAN TRADE: 1997
World World EU EU EU Trade (%)
Imports Exports Imports Exports as % World EU Trade
Algeria 8.69 13.98 4.353 8.361 56.08 0.71
Cyprus 3.70 1.10 1.353 2.025 70.42 0.19
Egypt 13.21 3.92 6.752 2.634 54.81 0.52
Israel 30.78 22.50 11.505 6.269 33.36 0.99
Jordan 4.10 1.84 928 454 23.23 0.08
Lebanon 7.46 0.72 3.094 153 38.99 0.18
Libya 5.59 10.60 2.769 7.612 64.11 0.58
Malta 2.56 1.64 1.998 701 64.28 0.15
Morocco 9.53 7.03 5.328 4.750 68.69 0.56
Palestine - - 39 1 - 0.00
Syria 4.03 3.92 1.948 372 29.18 0.13
Tunisia 7.91 5.56 5.285 4.016 69.04 0.52
Turkey 48.59 26.25 22.357 11.869 45.74 1.91
Total 146.15 99.06 67.709 49.217 47.69 6.54
Sources: Eurostat; WTO
Economic outcomes
What will be the outcome of these agreements? Will they indeed stimulate economic
development sufficiently fast to counter demographic pressures in a region where, until
the 1990s, population growth rates on average had been of the order of 2.3 to 2.6 per cent,
even if they have fallen dramatically in the past decade? It needs to be borne in mind that
population growth rates of the order of magnitude imply population doubling within
twenty-five years and that over 60 per cent of the populations of most South Mediterranean
countries are now below the age of twenty-five. It is also worth remembering that gross
domestic product growth rates, according to the World Bank, need to be between 5 and 7
per cent if the economies are to provide the necessary services in housing, education and
health, let alone actually achieve positive development – and this in a region which had
had an average growth in national wealth of between 1 and 2 per cent – including Israel
– during the previous twenty years, according to the European Commission in 1994. And,
finally, it should not be forgotten that, because of these economic failures and the
($ billion)
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consequences of intensive economic restructuring over the previous fifteen years, official
unemployment figures run at a chronic 15 to 30 per cent of the labour force. No wonder that
migration seems an attractive option, despite European xenophobia and official
discrimination.
There seems to be a growing consensus amongst analysts of the Mediterranean that the
promise of economic development, in the short-term at least, is illusory, partly for
theoretical and partly for practical reasons. The agreements themselves are closely modelled
on the “Washington Consensus” adopted by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund as prescriptions for developing economies enmeshed in heavy foreign debt
– as was indeed the case for most South Mediterranean economies. Neo-Liberal in
inspiration, they may well generate satisfactory macro-economic results but they depend
heavily on stimulating foreign investment and private sector entrepreneurs, as well as on
the increasingly discredited belief in “trickle-down” to achieve appropriate micro-economic
outcomes. Foreign private investment has proved stubbornly reluctant to seize the
opportunities the region offers, whether as direct investment or in the form of portfolio
investment as national capital markets emerge and privatisation programmes enlarge, so
that the Middle East runs just ahead of Africa in the total investment stakes, even though
global investment flows are picking up after the 1997 crisis. Little of the estimated $190
billion that was invested worldwide in 1999, for example, flowed into the Mediterranean,
largely because other destinations seemed more attractive – as they always have.
III: EUROPEAN UNION-MAGHRIB TRADE 1997
World World EU EU EU EU
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports (%)  Exports(%)
Algeria 8.69 13.98 4.35 8.36 50.5 59.9
Morocco 9.53 7.03 5.33 4.75 56.9 67.6
Tunisia 7.91 5.56 5.29 4.02 57.3 72.2
Total 26.13 26.57 14.97 17.13 57.3 64.5
In any case, the sheer size of the European market and the efficiency of European
companies almost certainly predicates that the “hub-spoke” dependency of the past
will continue and may even be worsened by trade creation and trade diversion effects.
The South Mediterranean is simply too small to be able to compete effectively and its
($ billion)
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economies will continue to be satellites to Europe, with a renewal of the dualism of the
past – a modern sector closely in touch with the European market in a series of
cross-Mediterranean trans-national regions and a traditional sector, serving the bulk
of the population and isolated from real benefit as income disparities increase. Only
economic integration within the South – anticipated by the Barcelona Process after
2010 – could create a market of sufficient size to attract foreign investment and, in
Gordon Brown’s immortal words, generate self-sustained “endogenous growth”.
Without that, the horizontal economic cleavages across South Mediterranean societies
will intensify, threatening the vertical integration that the political structures are
designed to sustain. In a sense, the details do not matter; what is important is that the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is acting as an immense experiment in a particular
vision of development economics – more so, perhaps, than any other example such as
NAFTA or Mercosur – and is already giving evidence of the stresses and defects that
will emerge.
IV: DIRECT PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
($ billion) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Algeria -59 22 -24 447 630 500
Cyprus 83 75 80 48 64 37
Egypt 493 1256 598 636 891 1076
Israel 596 432 1337 1382 1622 1850
Jordan -34 3 13 16 361 310
Lebanon 7 23 22 64 150 230
Malta 56 152 182 325 165 325
Morocco 491 551 332 354 1079 258
Syria 176 251 100 89 80 100
Tunisia 562 432 264 238 339 650
Turkey 636 608 885 722 805 940
Total 3007 3805 3789 4321 6186 6276
Sources: Nord-Sud Export 400, 9 June 2000; World Investment Report 1999; IMF International Financial
Statistics, March 2000.
Note: European Union direct foreign investment into the South Mediterranean is only 2 per cent of total Union
foreign investment. Total investment was below $7 billion in 1998, whereas China received $30 billion and Latin
America $70 billion for the same period. Inter-Arab investment was also weak, totalling only $18.5 billion
between 1975 and 1998, whilst Arab investment abroad in total (mainly in Europe and the United States) was
said to have reached $647 billion by 1998.
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Social and Political consequences
Of course, economic change also produces social change as well; indeed, under the
World Bank’s latest prescriptions for successful economic development, alongside openness
and export-oriented growth, stand transparency and accountability as factors essential to
attract the foreign investor and to ensure successful private sector development. Legitimacy,
too, particularly in the form of the rule-of-law, forms part of the new package and there is
an irresistible tendency, as behoves supporters of the economic theory of politics, to extend
this economic prescription into the political sphere as well. The elision of the political and
economic spheres is, to say the least, questionable, although it fits well within the current
orthodoxy of the match between liberal democracy and free market economies. Chile, after
all, demonstrated that this linkage was not necessarily the case in the late 1970s and the
1980s, as do Singapore and large parts of Asia today.
What is certainly the case is that there are cultural and social consequences of the kind
of economic development policies described above. One interesting consequence, which is
not directly related to the process itself but which is a by-product and which is also linked
to the phenomenon of migration is the development of cross-Mediterranean trade networks
between European suppliers and purchasers who are returned migrants. They will link in
easily to the globalised trade patterns that will result from the Barcelona Process and may
even become nuclei for development poles in the South. This is, incidentally, nothing new;
it was first identified by researchers in the University of Amsterdam in the 1970s and is
enshrined in the concept of trans-national economic regions. Another, which is related to
the Process, is the universalisation of a commercial culture which itself stems from
American and European paradigms, whatever the dominant cultural environment in
which it appears. This will add a further horizontal cleavage to the vertically-integrated
societies of the South Mediterranean region. It will only be hampered by the persistent
opaqueness of traditional private sector economic activity that thrives best without
transparency and seeks to perpetuate rent-seeking and economic privilege through its
political alliances.
The Barcelona Process, however – as befits a policy that is essentially bureaucratic in
nature – has much wider social and political ambitions than this. It is integral to the Process
that it should stimulate the growth of civil society within the context of legitimised
government. Ironically enough, this objective goes to the real heart of the crisis within the
South for, without a radical change in the nature of the political process there, the kinds
of conditions and commitment needed for successful economic development cannot
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evolve. Most governments in the South have been constructed on a corporatist basis; they
have sought to mobilise public support through vertically integrated political, social and
economic structures in which the single political party has been the most obvious symbol.
The attempt to achieve such structures, and to mobilise them for economic development,
failed long ago both because of ideological mistakes and because the corporatist objectives
themselves were unachievable. This political failure was associated with a further failure;
that of the patrimonial and prebendal nature of the state in the South. Power was arbitrary
and usually expressed through control of the army and the security mechanism by a group
within society that neither enjoyed generalised support nor reflected general social and
political goals and that often sought to monopolise the economic process as well.
The desire of the Barcelona Process to both force such political systems to become
legitimised and participatory, with restrictions on government power exercised by a
vibrant civil society, is thus laudable. What may be less so is the way in which this is to be
done. Considerable effort has gone into supporting non-governmental organisations under
the MEDA programme – rather less emphasis has been placed on political change,
particularly in respect of human rights. Thus considerable care is spent not upbraiding
Israel’s disgraceful treatment of the Palestinians, both in terms of the peace process – in
which Europe has very little say – and in terms of human rights abuses – about which it
could say a lot. Europe’s response to the massacres in Algeria in January 1998 was, to say
the least, feeble and persuaded the Algerian authorities that they had little to fear from
European disapproval. Equally, Tunisia’s bizarre and endless search for Islamist threats to
its own security, which involves repeated abuse of human rights goes virtually unremarked.
Of course, one cannot know what is said behind closed diplomatic doors or what effect this
has and this is quite correct – but “critical engagement” involves making such matters
explicit whilst dialogue continues.
One reason for this reluctance to respond to what is, perhaps, the easiest issue on the
collective Barcelona political agenda is that Europe and Southern governments share
certain common security anxieties. This is also, no doubt, the reason why much deeper
root-and-branch reform is not encouraged but there are also a certain and somewhat
arrogant blindness in Europe on the issue. We laud the electoral process, when it occurs
and tend to mistake it for genuine political participation of a kind that is globally
applicable; we rarely consider what form of participation would be appropriate for the
societies and cultures concerned. And although it is clear that cultural specificities can
easily be used as a cover for profound illiberalism, are we so certain that our preferred
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political paradigms are always so appropriate, or even liberal? Despite official claims that
there is no objection to political Islam, for instance, provided that it accepts the rules of the
democratic game – that there are winners and losers whose roles may be reversed by
electoral success – and that it abandons violence as a political argument – even though such
views are on the margin of the overall Islamist movement – it is a legitimate question to
wonder how welcoming we would really be were there any possibility that such a
government would come to power, except in Saudi Arabia? European reactions to Algeria
and Iran give little grounds for optimism, as far as acceptability is concerned.
It could be argued that only by creating effective civil societies and hence attitudes of
mind towards government, rather than institutions, can real and legitimate political
change be achieved. There is no doubt that this is so and that this alone could justify the
current official reluctance to engage governments directly in what would be wholly
counter-productive initiatives. De Tocqueville remarked almost two centuries ago that:
I accord institutions only secondary influence over the destiny of men. I am thoroughly
convinced that political societies are not what their laws make them but what they are
prepared in advance to be by the feelings, the beliefs, the ideas, the habits of heart and
mind of the men who compose them.
He was talking about the United States but his comments seem to be equally applicable
to the South Mediterranean region and argue for an increased commitment by the
European Union to building civil society and supporting indigenous political traditions,
which seek participation and social justice, even if they do not match European political
institutions themselves. How will the Union digest Libya’s political idiosyncracies, once
Colonel Qadhafi’s Jamahiriyah joins the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, as it will inevitably
do, once it decides that it can accept the European acquis? Europe will find it extremely
difficult to resist that Libyan embrace, once it comes, given the desire of South Mediterranean
states to see the Barcelona Process as genuinely universal, as far as non-European Union
member countries in the Mediterranean basin are concerned.
Cultural change is an integral part of this process – not the divisive extension of
Euro-American archetypes pilloried as McWorld or the Coca Cola culture – but the much
wider influences spread by the cinema, radio, satellite television and, latterly, the internet.
As they always did – for the phenomenon is not new, merely accelerated – they excite a
contradictory mixture of fascinated desire and moral repulsion. They thus stimulate
simultaneous attempts to emulate and to exclude, attempts which are the mirror image of
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Europe’s desire to exclude migrants but to export goods and services. And, even worse,
denial of access builds a determination to reject so that the contradictions inherent in the
Barcelona Process that encourage material satisfaction but deny freedom of access generate
their own dynamic of moral rejection and political opposition. It is stimulated, too, by
Europe’s own failure to mitigate the xenophobia and Islamophobia inherent in Europe
itself and its frequent failure to appreciate the consequences of its own initiatives in the
field of security. For much of the violence directed towards Europe and indeed towards
indigenous government in the South Mediterranean – whether Islamist or not – stems from
the politics of exclusion and resentment.
The issue of security
Indeed, perhaps the most contentious issue is that of security within the Barcelona
Process. By the end of the year 2000, during the French presidency of the Union, the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was due to have drawn up a Charter for Peace and
Stability in the Mediterranean along lines adopted by the Stuttgart summit of the Union in
June 1999. These guidelines were really no more than a woolly list of desiderata extending
into the social and politico-economic fields as well as dealing with specific security issues.
In part, this was because the Barcelona process is primarily concerned with soft security,
even though, with the Western European Union due to be folded into the Union itself,
together with its EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR forces, as well as the projected 60,000 –
strong rapid deployment force proposed at Helsinki in December 1999, now to be available
as part of a future European Defence and Security Policy, there is some muscle to back up
hard security concerns as well. Yet such potential unilateral approaches to what is
supposed to be an initiative to support common security goals is precisely what many
Southern states fear. The row that erupted when EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR were
announced in 1997 was sufficient indication of that! Nor have Southern fears been eased
by the appointment of Xavier Solana as the first secretary-general of the common foreign
and security policy, given his previous role as NATO secretary-general.
Ironically enough, the continued existence of NATO as the vehicle of European
collective security is the major source of dissention as far as collective Mediterranean
security is concerned. The prolonged NATO dialogue with only some of the South
Mediterranean members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has done little to build
confidence in NATO’s overall objectives and what little confidence there was has been
eroded by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 – ironically enough, even though NATO
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endlessly pointed out that its actions were in support of a Muslim population – and by the
new NATO strategy announced last year. The tripartite objectives of Article 5 obligations,
out-of-area activities and humanitarian intervention sent shivers up many southern spines,
not least because, in the Mediterranean, NATO’s out-of-area activities seemed directed
against weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons and soft security targets such as
migration, drugs and international crime and political terrorism. Nor was it the topics that
formed the out-of-area agenda alone that caused such anxiety, it was the unilateral nature
of the decision-making process in which Southern states would be the objects of security,
not participants in its application.
Of course, nothing is so clear-cut Egyptian, Jordanian, Moroccan and Tunisian forces
have engaged in Operation Brightstar exercises with American forces. Jordanians and
Moroccans have also participated in SFOR’s operations in Bosnia. There are clearly cases
where, in terms of peace-keeping if not peace-making, cooperation already exists. It is,
however, in the way in which Europe’s hard security concerns in the Mediterranean
appear to be hived off into the NATO arena in which the Partnership has no voice that
creates anxieties about Europe’s good faith over common security concerns. And then,
furthermore, there is the United States. America has been excluded from the Barcelona
Process, largely at French behest and much to Washington’s irritation. More seriously, the
United States, for whom the Mediterranean is not significant in national security terms,
has, nonetheless – as was mentioned above – a much more complex appreciation of
security problems there. It controlled – perhaps unintentionally torpedoed – the complicated
Middle East peace process and is not too willing to consider burden-sharing with Europe
outside the purely financial arena. It considers Turkey, Egypt and Algeria as significant
regional hegemons or potential hegemons and does not accept the holistic European vision
of an equality of states, preferring instead to reduce the Mediterranean into a series of
sub-regions for analytical purposes. It cannot divorce Balkan issues from the overall
picture, nor can it ignore the Mediterranean’s role as a strategic line of communication,
given its concerns over world energy prices – and instability in the Mediterranean is
certainly bound to affect the global price of oil.
America is, in short, an integral player in the Mediterranean, particularly in security
terms – its economic significance is much less – and it cannot therefore be excluded from
the security equation. Yet, at present, Europe has not found a place for it within the overall
Partnership structure. South Mediterranean states know this well and this knowledge saps
a little at their commitment to the security aspects of the Barcelona Process, not least
because, during 1999, the United States hinted that there might be an alternative to
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Barcelona on offer – the Eizenstat Initiative. In reality, this has never amounted to much,
being largely a device to isolate Libya in the Maghrib, but the interest with which
Tunisians, in particular, took up the issue indicated their profound uncertainties about the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships5.
The most profound anxiety for Southern members of the Partnership is the most recent
of Europe’s initiatives, the intervention in Kosovo and the resulting doctrine of humanitarian
intervention with its implied breach of the sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty
through intervention. It is true, of course, that 70 per cent of the military burden was borne
by the United States – somewhat reluctantly, by all accounts – but, for Southern
Mediterraneans, it is Europe, which looms nearest over the Mediterranean horizon. The
flavour of Southern anxieties was given in President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reply to Kofi
Annan’s suggestion at the end of 1999 that humanitarian intervention should be integrated
into the United Nations vision. Take care, said the Algerian president, that this is not
merely a cover for a renewed form of colonialism, for that is how it will be seen in the
South. Indeed, that is true of much of the Barcelona acquis, economic, social and political
– for better or worse, Southern states increasingly feel that the bargain they entered into in
1995 is becoming a unilateral imposition and an intervention in which hard-won sovereignty
from colonialism is to be tom apart by European-directed globalisation as the past is
re-created but labelled anew. What is Kosovo, they ask, but a Protectorate and what is a
Protectorate or a Mandate, but subjugation even if it is called liberation?
Interestingly enough, the problems inherent in collective and cooperative security
between a group of states with very different agendas and concerns was underlined by the
fact that the Charter promised at the end of 2000 could not be agreed amongst the
twenty-seven states that make up the Partnership. Southern states found the Union‘s
proposals unacceptable and the French presidency was unable to bridge the gaps in trust
and understanding that existed, not least because of the collapse of the Middle East peace
process. The simple fact is that Mediterranean security is indivisible and hard security and
soft security concerns are bound to impinge on one another. Equally, too, if the
Mediterranean is genuinely to be treated as a shared common space, elements and aspects
of it cannot be amputated because of the interests of outside powers, be they the United
States, Russia or the Gulf Even if the Barcelona Process is to serve specifically European
interests, thus underlining the role of the Mediterranean as the “forgotten frontier”, the
same assumptions will apply, particularly in the case of the Middle East, if not the Balkans.
5 Congress did allocate $5 million in 1999 and 2000 to the Initiative!
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The future
By this reading, therefore, the Barcelona Process becomes no more than a kind of
enforced peripheral regionalisation, a unilateral globalisation process writ small, in which
sovereign states have lost their sovereignty – it never amounted to much anyway, given the
compromises with international institutions over the years – and have been offered a deal
they cannot refuse because no other is available and nobody else can offer an alternative.
Matters, of course, are not quite like that; it is true that South Mediterranean states had
little choice but to accept the Barcelona Declaration but it is also true that they were anxious
to do so, recognising their inescapable partnership with Europe, in economic terms at least.
It is equally true that governments there know that they cannot indefinitely resist the
popular clamour for participatory political systems. What is difficult is the insensitivity of
the European response and the unwillingness – to engage, beyond the level of government,
with the very civil society that Europe claims it wishes to encourage. There is also a need
to persuade Southern governments that the implied abrogation of sovereignty – which,
unlike the past, is not voluntary but an inherent component of the Barcelona Process – is
justified by the ultimate benefits; benefits which will not mean a cultural and social
homogenisation but which will preserve cultural, social and political specificities within an
integrative framework. And they are determined to gain a better deal over economic
development.
All these issues also inform the much wider global agenda that international affairs
commentators seek to interpret, so that the Barcelona Process really does become a
paradigm in itself for the future. Yet there is one aspect, implicit in the Barcelona
Declaration but far removed from the day-to-day negotiations and disagreements, which
is rarely mentioned in regional security discussions – the degree of European dependence
on the Southern Mediterranean region. It is a little-appreciated fact that the liberalisation
of European energy markets and the “dash for gas” is producing a degree of European
dependence on Mediterranean suppliers that the designers of the Barcelona Process never
anticipated. The issue is not one of oil, for alternative suppliers can always be relatively
easily found. It is Europe’s future dependence on natural gas that is at issue. Algeria
already supplies 18 to 20 per cent of European gas demand, but when Libya’s Western Gas
Project comes on stream in 2003, that European dependence on North African gas supplies
will rise towards a quarter of total demand. Gas is also due to come from Central Asia via
Turkey and from the Gulf too, so that, within twenty years the Mediterranean may become
a major or even the major gas supplier to Europe. It is a dependence that cannot easily be
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altered, given the massive investment in fixed pipeline infrastructure – so that Europe, in
its turn, becomes dependent on those that are its own clients. Although history suggests
that there is little danger of a crippling interruption in supply – during the past eight years
of the Algerian crisis, supply was only interrupted for a period of four days and European
states have up to one year’s worth of gas in storage against failures in supply – this might
not be true if real sustained violence erupted in the South Mediterranean region.
Allied to this concern, which has profound security implications for Europe, is another,
which ironically enough, undermines Europe’s real Barcelona agenda. This is that, in the
years to come, Europe is going to increasingly depend on migrant labour, as European
populations age and the European labour-force shrinks. Recently the United Nations
Development Programme suggested that, within fifty years, Europe would need 136
million additional labourers – and they can only come from the Mediterranean basin! The
figures may be exaggerated, but the problem is not-Germany and Britain, after all, are
already proposing a green-card scheme to overcome their shortage of computer skills; to
the sound of polite scepticism from South Asia, where Indian and Pakistani computer
experts anticipate far greater benefits from the United States. And the problems with
unskilled and semi-skilled labour-areas in which Europeans will not work – will be even
more acute. Perhaps, therefore, European statesmen should be busy trying to discourage
the intensifying strains of xenophobia and racism that are coming to characterise the
European discourse over migration and political asylum, rather than exploiting them for
short-term electoral gain. In short, just as with energy dependence, Europe cannot escape
its Mediterranean involvement – a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have
interesting social and cultural consequences and should be the real paradigm for the
future! Thus, in a perfect circle, soft power projection becomes inter-dependence as the
“forgotten frontier” becomes the common arena – the stated objective of the Barcelona
Process, if not its underlying purpose.
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